INTRODUCTION
The study of wealth inequality among individuals has received a great deal of discussion in news, trade, and academic publications since the financial crisis, especially as wealth continues to accumulate to the top societal earners. 13 There has also been a growing body of literature on the concentrated accumulation of corporate ownership among institutional investors. Azar et al. (2018) study the anti-competitive effects of institutional investor ownership in the airline industry and find evidence of reduced competition on selected air routes when common ownership is present. However, Patel (2018) argues that the presence of common ownership by institutional investors is not enough to show anticompetitive behavior; common ownership may simply be a result of investment choice.
Since the shift from defined benefit to defined contribution plans, the amount of investment capital 13 A recent article in the Quarterly Journal of Economics notes that the top 0.1% of society owned 22% of private wealth in 2012 -nearly the same levels as 1929 (Saez & Zucman, 2016) .
controlled by institutional investors has grown significantly.
14 These institutional investors control significant stakes of many corporations and may exert a disproportionate influence on the management of invested firms through proxy votes and managerial engagement. For example, in January 2018, the CEO of Blackrock Capital (the largest asset manager in the world), citing a need for long-term growth and value creation by the firms in which Blackrock invests, issued a public letter that Blackrock would take a more active role in engaging with company management rather than simply using proxy votes to influence firm decisions (Morrell, 2018) .
Our study examines the trends in institutional ownership in the publicly-traded U.S. banking and insurance industries. We specifically examine the relationship between firm performance and risktaking, the presence of concentrated institutional investor ownership. We focus our sample on the banking and insurance industries partly due to their Institutional investor ownership has often been considered a corporate governance variable, typically used to proxy those investors' ability to influence managers and to expropriate wealth from smaller shareholders. Large institutional investors have developed common holdings across numerous firms within industries. We consider the effects of institutional investor ownership on the performance of banks and insurance companies. Using a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity model with firm-and year-fixed effects, we find strong statistical relation between performance and individual firm's ownership stakes by Blackrock, Inc. and Fidelity Investments. Moreover, we find a positive and statistically significant relation between performance and the percentage of the industry's equity owned by the Blackrock, Fidelity, State Street and Vanguard. The findings suggest that organizations like Blackrock are successful in obtaining long-term returns by exerting influence over the management of their invested firms, which is consistent with recent statements by the CEO of Blackrock but is also consistent with a "bet on the winners" strategy.
Keywords: Institutional Ownership, Performance, Risk, Insurance, Banking economic significance; according to the Brookings Institute, finance and insurance represented seven percent of U.S. GDP in 2014 (Bailey, 2016) . Additionally, these firms operate in highly regulated arenas. Bank oversight is largely performed by the Federal Reserve System and insurers by state regulators; in addition, as publicly traded entities, our sample firms also face scrutiny by the Securities Exchange Commission. Closer monitoring of firm risk-taking -especially the limiting of downside risk in these industries -results in smaller performance variation than would be found in less regulated industries. Finding the cause of performance variation in this smaller variation range allows us to draw inferences from the sample with a higher level of credibility.
Our analysis first examines the relation between firm performance, which we measure as Tobin's q, and firm financial, risk, and governance variables. We then add institutional investor holdings of both the firm and industry to our model. We find that holdings of institutional investors in a firm have a significant impact on performance results. We also find a positive impact when a selected combination of investors holds a large share in the industry.
Common ownership and its effects on firm performance have caught the attention of researchers just recently. Empirical works by Azar et al. (2018) and Azar et al. (2016) focus on product specific issues. This paper examines the overall performance of firms under common ownership.
The structure of the paper follows. Section 2 summarizes the literature and set-up of common ownership of companies. Section 3 describes the sampled data, followed by the methodology and variable selection in Section 4. The empirical results and inferences are reported in Section 5. The conclusion is presented in Section 6, along with a discussion of the limitations of the work, and suggestions for future research.
PRIOR LITERATURE AND THEORY
The role of institutional investors in the governance of firms is changing. A 2000 review of the prior 20-year period claimed, "despite the substantial growth of institutional ownership of U.S. corporations ... there is little evidence that institutional investors have acquired the kind of concentrated ownership positions required to be able to play a dominant role in the corporate governance process" (Edwards & Hubbard, 2000, p. 92) . A more recent study observes that data on institutional ownership is consistent with a hypothesis that common ownership is used to coordinate firm behavior in some airline routes (Azar et al., 2018) . Others have been more specific: "mutual funds and other institutional investors may cause softer competition among product market rivals because of their significant ownership stakes in competing firms in concentrated industries" (Posner et al., 2017, p. 1) .
Consistent with Azar et al.'s (2018) productspecific study, industry-specific studies also find a statistical correlation between ownership patterns by an institutional investor and performance (Pooser et al., 2017) . Industrial Organization studies note that it is often difficult to distinguish between competition and monopolistic competition because both drive excess profit to zero. Similarly, it is difficult when examining institutional investors to distinguish between skilled stock selection and exertion of a coordinating influence because each can be a cause of good performance.
The possibility of firm coordination through common ownership has long been recognized but its researchers have opined that "significant legal obstacles discourage institutional investors both from taking large block positions and from exercising large ownership positions to control corporate managers" (Edwards & Hubbard, 2000, p. 92) . That observation may have been accurate in 2000 but, fewer than 20 years later, we observe that four systemically significant institutional investors own large blocks of many firms in the financial sector; in fact, we find the same block of firms involved as those mentioned by legal scholars (Baker, 2016) . While one study suggests that monopoly rents were being earned (Azar et al., 2018) , recent reconsiderations argue that evidence of such an effect is imperfect (Kennedy et al., 2017 ). Yet, no one questions the logic of a possible exploitation of individual firms in an industry for the good of the industry. We are left with a choice of bad alternatives if we do not accept the Azar observation: either those with common ownership are blind to the possibility of benefit, or they are executing poorly. This study provides the support underpinning the logic of a benefit from common ownership. It then seeks evidence of such a benefit by comparing two sub-sectors of the financial services industry: Banking and Insurance. Finally, we consider the question of how an institutional investor can successfully influence a firm to behave in an industry-performance-maximization, rather than a firm-performance-maximization manner. More specifically, we suggest that firms with higher than average institutional ownership have higher than average risk levels. A relevant question, which we return to below, is how to measure risk.
As the importance of institutional investors increased, 15 agency theorists argued that external monitors counter managerial incentives to expropriate firm value for personal gain (Pound, 1991; Black, 1992) . Empirical support for the monitoring argument is not strong; investments by large investors tend to be persistent over time, providing support for management rather than posing a threat in the face of poor performance. And corporate expenses, such as CEO compensation, tend to be higher in the presence of blockholder involvement (Mehran, 1995) .
Additionally, literature has been developing about a topic that has come to be known as common ownership. The literature focuses on ownership by institutional investors of a collection of firms that compete in the same industry. In this common ownership literature, researchers have identified Blackrock and a few legal journals have extended the linkage to groupings of institutional investors; specifically, BlackRock, State Street, Vanguard, and Fidelity (Eckstein, 2018) . This study considers a wider range of ownership types. Though the number 15 "Over the years, the influence of institutional investors over public companies has grown dramatically, with the number of U.S. corporate shares managed by institutional investors ballooning to 67 percent in 2010 from a mere 5 percent in 1945, according to a study conducted by professors at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania" (Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, 2015).
of bank and insurance firms in the sample of this study is approximately matched, the number of family-controlled insurer observations, 211, far exceeds the number of family-controlled bank observations, 70.
The behavior of institutional investors gives rise to another ownership behavior pattern that is only recently being studied. Individuals who invest with mutual funds or institutional investors are less interested in the performance of a specific firm than in the aggregate performance of a grouping of firms represented in the fund portfolio. The large concentration of wealth held in these funds gives limited opportunities for the funds to concentrate on any one firm; instead, they diversify their holdings and hope that the sectors will perform well. A question considered in this study is whether the fund managers do more than hope for sector performance. Freeman (2018) states that "common ownership could induce firms to interact differently than they would if each firm was seeking individual value maximization" (p. 4). She defines common ownership as the extent to which firms are held by the same institutional investors and finds evidence that the relationship between common ownership and vertical relationship strength is causal. Consistent with this theory, a hypothesized noncompetitive market effect associated with ownership of corporate competitors by a diversified institutional investor is found by Azar et al. (2018) . They determined that airline ticket prices on selected routes were 10 percent higher due to common ownership by a specific institutional investor. The authors argue that this diversified institutional owner of most of the firms in an industry focuses on industry performance as opposed to firm specific performance. However, due to their ability to devote resources toward research and expertise in choosing investments, it is also possible that institutional investors may invest in firms expected to outperform others in their industry.
Literature on Institutional owners is rapidly evolving. Existing studies note that Institutional owners affect the corporate policies of those firms in which they invest in R&D (Bushee, 1998 Y i -a goal for optimization, such as firm profit or value;
X -a vector of production inputs; P -a vector of input prices; C -state of industry competition; G -corporate governance conditions; F -a vector of fund ownership shares; λ -constraints; and i -a firm in industry I; and j -industry.
For a firm, i, in industry j, the firm's goal is to maximize Y given X, P, C, F, G, λ. But each institutional investor's goal is to maximize their return on investments from all firms in the industry. This strategy does not preclude betting on a single company but that implies a monopolistic industry. The following goal is consistent with the full range of competitive industry structures: InvΠ j =ΣY ij *F ij .
The larger the institutional investor, the more likely they own diversified shares of the industry. We speculate that it is the diversification of ownership in the industry that makes each investor have an industry rather than a firm focus. Put simply, a particular firm's managers will be more sensitive to the opinion of a significant investor if they know that investor also holds a large share of its competitors. The insurer subsample was identified by selecting all firms in the Compustat database reporting a NAICS code of 524xx; 212 firms. From this identified set of insurance-related firms, the following groups were excluded: foreign based (ADR trading), health care providers; low-volume traded companies; penny stocks; mortgage guarantee companies, and companies that had insufficient data in the Compustat or CRSP databases. 17 Banks were identified following the procedure in Cornett et al (2010) . We identify the top 150 FDIC bank holding companies for the 2006 through 2016 period and exclude alien-owned banks, acquired banks, privately owned banks, and banks for which there 16 One firm, ticker AFSI, is counted twice here because the firm includes both insurance and banking activities in its SEC filings. The firm is treated as an insurer because that is its predominant business. The reduction in insurers between 2014 and 2016 is attributable to consolidation in the industry. 17 CRSP data is used to compute a measure of risk.
DATA DESCRIPTION
was no Compustat data. The remaining 88 insurance firms and 89 banks were trimmed to the final sample of 84 insurers and 82 banks because information gathered from the DEF 14A (Proxy Statement), described below, was not available.
Our study data is from Compustat, 10-K statements, DEF 14A statements, and FactSet. We use Compustat to gather income statement and balance sheet items for the identified firms in our sample. If any of this data is not available through Compustat, we look for it in the 10-K Annual report. Data for the Focus variable, our measure of line of business concentration, was collected directly from the 10-K statements. We gathered executive compensation, family ownership, director and officer ownership, and our duality variables from the DEF 14A (Proxy) Statements. Institutional investor ownership is only reported in the DEF 14A if an institutional investor owns at least 5% of the firm's shares. To measure institutional investor ownership more granularly than this, we use FactSet ownership data which reports the share of each firm owned by institutional investors. 18 In both our banking and insurance samples, we note that four large institutional investors frequently holding stakes in most firms: Blackrock Capital, Vanguard, Fidelity, and State Street Bank. Therefore, much of our analysis considers the ownership stakes of these largest institutional investors.
VARIABLE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY
This study seeks to relate the effects of institutional investor holdings with firm performance and risk. We measure firm-level performance by Tobin's q, a practice also used by other papers in the area (see Boyd & Solarino, 2016 , for a survey of the corporate ownership literature). Theoretically, Tobin' q is the ratio of a firm's market value to the replacement cost of its assets (Brainard & Tobin, 1968) , and is often interpreted as measure of managerial performance (Lang et al., 1989) , which is the focus of this study. A set of factors expected to have an influence on performance are included in the analysis, in addition to the institutional investor ownership constructs. Our control variables include financial factors (size, leverage, liquidity, risk), governance constructs (compensation structure, board-management structure, i.e. duality, family ownership, and non-family director and officer ownership), as well as risk variables. Summary statistics for our variables are presented in Table 1 , along with expected signs of control variables.
Financial variables
Our financial control variables are standard for any firm-level empirical study, with data coming from Compustat. We include a measure of size (the 18 For each year from 2006 through 2016, and for each insurer and bank, we obtain from the FactSet database the voting percentage of each institutional. This generated 164,902 observations and 12,349 different investors. Principal component analysis identified commonalities among these investors and the rotated factor patterns reveal a structure involving BlackRock, Vanguard, State Street, and a less strong relationship with Wells Fargo (i.e., rotated factor loadings are 80, 72, 83, and 46, respectively). Arguments made in other papers lead to the consideration of a different grouping, but the overlap is substantial. Eckstein (2018) calls attention to BlackRock, State Street, Vanguard, and Fidelity, which we use in our study. natural logarithm of a firm's assets) because size may indicate potential economies of scope or scale and because size is frequently linked to firm performance in empirical studies. We use the logarithm value of assets in this investigation to remedy the distribution skewness, as typical of similar studies. The average value of Size of firms in the sample is 9.729, translated to about $16.8 million dollars. Size is expected to be negatively related to the dependent variable, as can be seen from the formula of Tobin's q. Leverage represents the extent to which a firm utilizes debt to finance its operations and is often also considered a governance measure based on a theory that debtholders can exert a risk dampening influence that may enhance their ability to obtain repayment of loaned funds. We use the DuPont Leverage measure, which estimates the effective use of debt rather than its quantity. DuPont Leverage is equal to the difference between ROE and ROA, which will be zero when a firm does not hold debt (Smith, 1999) . We prefer the DuPont Leverage measure over other leverage values because insurers and banks almost completely finance their operations through borrowing -banks through deposits and insurers through premiums. The values of assets and liabilities are very skewed in these industries. Leverage is hypothesized to positively related to the dependent variable. The mean of Leverage in the sample is 0.081, suggesting the firms take advantage of equity more effective than debt.
We include the ratio of cash and short-term equities to total assets as a measure of liquidity. When liquidity is low, a firm may have trouble financing operations and obligations if a loss event occurs. On the other hand, too high liquidity may suggest the firm need to identify quality investment opportunities. The sampled firms report a wide range of percentage of cash and equivalent to assets, with the minimum close to zero while the maximum about 84%. Our final financial control variable is "business focus". We measure this variable with a Herfindahl index of reported segment revenues. Higher HHI values suggest greater focus on a specific segment (the maximum HHI, a value of 1, occurs when there is only 1 segment). Most firms sampled diversify their business portfolio, but we do observe at least one firm relies on a single sector. While the greater focus is associated with greater potential volatility in earnings, prior studies have found a negative relation between line of business diversification and firm performance. The effect of Focus on firm performance is mixed.
Governance variables
We collect data for executive compensation, family ownership, director and officer ownership, and duality variables from the DEF 14A (Proxy) Statements filed with SEC by publicly traded companies. We consider the effect of CEO compensation using both total compensation, and the portion of total compensation that is sensitive to the future performance of the firm. Total compensation is in logarithm value, with a minimum value of zero and the maximum 4.758. Future compensation is equal to the ratio of stock and option compensation to total compensation. The majority of sampled firms report that 38.9% of total CEO compensation are paid in stocks or options, with zero and 100% on two extremes. This futurelooking compensation variable is expected to be positively associated with firm performance. We also consider CEO-Board Chair Duality: a binary measure identifying cases where one person is both the CEO and Board Chair. A CEO was simultaneously Board chairperson in almost half of the observations, 787 firm-years; this simultaneity is more common in banking (445 banks and 342 insurers have a dual leadership structure). This typical governance measure yields conflicting evidence in the literature. Some argue it is a bad governance feature because the structure stifles criticism; others suggest that it speeds the ability of the firm to enjoy opportunistic gains that might be lost if more extensive board review were required. Another source of concentrated ownership, for some firms, is the family-controlled firm. We identify family-controlled firms with a binary measure when a family has at least a 15 percent interest and, typically, if a founding family member has a seat on the board. We also consider the percentage of the firm owned by non-family directors and officers. We conjecture this variable is positively related to firm performance in that the interest of management is more align with stockholders when directors and officers hold a higher stake of the firm. 
Risk variables
Descriptions of risk in the context of business are often vague about the kind of risk referred to; two of the usual alternatives are the possible operational outcomes of the firm and the alternative values one can realize from selling an ownership interest in the firm (i.e., stock). Some theories attempt to link the two concepts. The efficient market hypothesis, for example, suggests that any negative or positive operational possibilities will be incorporated into the stock price of the firm. Investor risk, which we measure as the coefficient of variation (CV) of daily stock price, represents dispersion in the market's understanding of a firm's value. For the owner of a firm, this may be the most relevant risk measure because great volatility in stock price increases the likelihood that an investor's return will be lower than anticipated. Stock price volatility will also be high in times of great growth or recession. Operational risk implies a volatility that has a potentially negative consequence for the operation of the firm. 19 Both risk measures are expected to relate to firm performance in a negative manner. We compute both financial and 19 We also considered the CV of quarterly operating activities net cash flow. The CV of operating cash flow is a rough approximation of operating risk because a very "risky" firm, say a company with millions riding on the introduction of a new drug, can lose everything if it does not obtain FDA approval, yet its cash management may be excellent, and it may never have experienced a negative cash flow.
operational risk measures using data collected from Compustat and CRSP. In our sample, the standard deviation of ROA over 8 quarters (operational risk) is about 0.003, with the highest of 0.074 and the lowest almost zero. The daily stock price displays a much more volatile behavior, with the maximum value being more than 300 times the minimum.
Institutional ownership variables
Data for institutional ownership is collected from FactSet. Table 1 reports that Blackrock holds an average of 5.63% of each sampled firm throughout the 11-year period. Table 2 presents the trend in industry-wide ownership by the four institutional investors. At the end of 2016, the combined investments of the four cited institutional investors (Blackrock Capital, Fidelity, State Street Bank, and Vanguard) accounts for about 20 percent of banking industry ownership and 22 percent of insurance industry ownership. We hypothesize that firm performance is positively related to institutional ownership.
Of the four institutions, Fidelity is committed to steady investment in both industries in the period of observation, after a minor decrease in the first several years studied. Over the same period, State Street maintained its investment position in the banking industry but almost doubled its ownership in the insurance industry. Blackrock was the largest single investor across firms in both industries at any time; its stake in both the banking and insurance industries increased during the 11-year period. Vanguard's stake in both industries had the highest rate of investment, from less than 1 percent in 2006 to about 7 percent in 2016 in each industry. When institutional investors increase their ownership in both industries, however, the investment in individual firms is not evenly distributed. Starting in 2015, Blackrock held a stake in every publicly traded insurance firm, at various percentages with the highest, 15.55 percent, in UIHC (United Insurance Holding Corp). A similar pattern is observed in Blackrock's banking investments. 
Methodology
Our analysis consists of two primary empirical tests: a base model specification of firm performance and our primary model with institutional investor variables.
All control variables are interacted with a banking dummy variable to separate potential industry effects between insurance companies and banks. We also include firm-and year-fixed effects as additional controls. The base model takes the form:
While the primary model is specified as:
where ∑ =1 is our vector of institutional investor effects.
The vector of institutional investor variables is employed to capture the effects of ownership by Blackrock, Fidelity, Vanguard, and State Street on firm performance. In addition, we also include a variable in an effort to capture the effect of institutional investors' ownership of the industries. Specifically, Big4Ind is the sum of the four organization's ownership of the insurance and banking industry, separately. For all insurers:
where the summation with respect to f runs through all publicly traded insurers while the summation with respect to i aggregates across the four institutional investors. Preliminary analysis based on ordinary least square estimation method indicates strong autocorrelation among residuals of the dependent variable, Tobin's q. In fact, the order 1 autocorrelation coefficient of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) residuals from the base model are 0.3547. Therefore the OLS error terms in equations (1) and (2) are not independent and the estimation results from OLS are not efficient, although unbiased. We apply a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model to correct the autocorrelation and potential heteroscedasticity problem. In specific, we test the following set of specifications of our primary model's residuals:
The specification combines an autoregressive with order two error model with a GARCH (1,1) variance model. The coefficients 1 , 2 , , , are estimated simultaneously with those in equations (1) or (2) together using maximum likelihood estimation method. Table 3 reports the estimates of the AR(2)-GARCH(1,1) model when institutional investor ownership information is not included, referred to hereafter as the base model.
RESULTS

Base model results
The bottom section of Table 3 suggests the model specification is able to remedy the autoregressive and heteroscedasticity problem. The error term in equation (1) for base model displays autocorrelation at order 2. The non-zero values of , indicate un-equal variance of residuals from equation (1) .
The effects of independent variables on firm performance are reported in the top section, with heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors. The top-left panel of Table 3 displays the results of firm characteristics variables, while the right panel reports the results of firm characteristics interacted with bank indicator. Those in the right thus reflect the incremental effects on banks. Of the characteristics considered, only focus and Duality appear insignificant for insurers, but the incremental analysis shows that Size, Leverage, Future compensation, and duality are the only factors that affect bank performance. Size, Leverage, Liquidity, the two executive compensation measures (LnTotComp and CompFut), and Family ownership all have significant and positive effects on insurers. The net effect on banks (not reported), for example, can be determined by the combined effects of these variables and their interaction with Bank dummy.
The results reinforce the appropriateness of considering separately the two financial service sectors. 
Firm performance and institutional ownershipomitted variables identified
To test for the presence of the hypothesis of omitted variables, investor ownership. We compute the correlation between each institutional investor's ownership stake in individual firm (as well as the percentage of each industry owned by the four institutions altogether in each year) and the residuals from the base model, i,t. Table 4 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients. The results suggest that residuals from the base model are significantly related to Blackrock's ownership at a 1% significance level (with a coefficient of 0.092 with p-value of less than 0.001). The residual from the base model is also significantly related to firm ownership held by Vanguard and State Street. We can also see that Blackrock ownership in insurers and banks is positively correlated with ownership by the other three organizations. It is this crossownership correlation that supports the supplemental study of a group effect. 
Primary model results
The results are reported in Table 5 . The autoregressive structure of the residuals is now valid at order one (the autoregressive structure is valid at order one with the coefficient of -0.27 and is statistically significant at a 1% significance level). The residual variances are also corrected; coefficients ρ and φ are non-zero and significant. Finally, the fit of the primary model has improved over that of the base model, reflected by the values of Total R-square and AIC.
Consistent with Table 3 , the effects of the control variables are reported in the top section of the table. The left panel displays the effects on bank and insurance companies and the right one are the incremental effects on banks only. The net effects on banks can be obtained by combining the results in the left and the right.
Of all control variables (those reported in Table 3 ), the results presented on the left side of Table 5 show a positive effect on Tobin's q for Leverage and Liquidity, consistent with the hypotheses. Specifically, when Leverage increases by one unit, the firm's performance (be it insurer or bank) is 0.053 better and the effect is statistically significant. Combining the result for Leverage in the right column, we see that a bank's performance increases even greater, indicated by the coefficient of 0.135 (statistically significant at 1% level). This finding is opposite to that of Pooser et al. (2017) where leverage is measured as the ratio of liability to assets. While previous research report mixed findings on Liquidity and Family Control, our results suggest positive effects of these two variables on insurer performance. The Family effect on insurers is consistent with Pooser et al. (2017) . The net Liquidity effect on banks is not significant (a test was run to examine whether the sum of coefficients of Liquidity and that of Liquidity*Bank dummy is zero. The null hypothesis could not be rejected. The same procedure was performed on other control variables except for institutional ownership). The net effect of Family on banks is significant but negative, perhaps another indicator that the two financial industries should be treated differently. Ownership by Directors and Officers and the level of operational risk are negatively related to insurer performance (consistent with our conjecture), but not significantly related to banks' performance measure. Variables that are insignificant in explaining insurer performance include Size, Focus (business concentration), two compensation variables, Duality and Investor risk. Among these factors, Size, the percentage of stock based compensation in the total (CompFut) and Duality are negatively and significantly related to bank performance. The net effects of Focus, total compensation, and Investor Risk on bank performance are all insignificant. Our variables of interest are institutional ownerships by each of the four named investors, and the combined percentage of all four together. The ownerships held by two institutional investors, Blackrock and Fidelity, are indeed associated with an individual firm's performance in a positive manner. When Blackrock's ownership in an insurance company or bank increases by one percentage, the firm's performance measured by Tobin's q, increases by at least 0.003. In the case of Fidelity, the increase in Tobin's q is at least 0.001 for one percentage point increase in Fidelity's ownership of the firm.
Vanguard and State Street are not observed to exert any direct and significant effects on the performance of firms they invest in. This may suggest that all institutional investors do not adopt the same strategy. However, and interestingly, the aggregate ownership by the Big Four investors is found to be positively related to an individual firm's performance, possibly driven by that of Blackrock and Fidelity. The use of the term "at least" above is because a one percent increase in ownership of a firm by, say, Blackrock, would also increase the percent of the industry owned by Blackrock, the Big4Industry variable. When the Big Four increase their investment in insurance or banking industry by one percentage point, Tobin's q of individual insurer or bank is found to increase by 0.0032 and the effect is significant at 1% level. The real question would be how? What is the mechanism that institutional investors' investment in an industry affects the performance of individual firms? We could follow Azar et al. (2016 Azar et al. ( , 2018 and speculate that the Big4Industry relationship reflects an anticompetitive effect -either explicit or tacit collusion -but there is no a priori reason to assume this causal relationship. It is possible that the relationship exists because the investors have an ability, over time, to reward better performing firms. Some research suggests that funds rewarded by new money use the funds to bet on winners and, for a time, the strategy continues to beat the market (Zheng 2002) . We speculate that this type of investment behavior could also result in a positive effect. We take no position about the cause of the positive relations but the puzzle, which runs counter to the efficient market hypothesis, remains.
CONCLUSION
Control of a stock corporation can range from wholly owned to very small stock percentages held by a large and diverse group of owners. A large part of the focus of modern financial theory is on the consequence of diverse ownership and the consequent need to align owner-manager incentives. Strains of the governance literature consider the effect on firms when identified blocks of shares are held by an individual or small group (e.g., directors and officers, families, or block holders). This focus of this paper is on situations where the control of the firm may be implied from ownership blocks, either a controlling block in the hands of a family or through the coordinated ownership of a group of institutional investors. An assumption in almost all studies is that the goals of the firm include value or profit maximization. Family-control oriented studies question whether the stewardship nature of such ownership modifies the short-term profit maximization goal. The director and officer perspective questions whether value maximization is affected by managerial expropriation influences. Recent studies of institutional investors yield conflicting evidence of an empirically significant effect on industry performance, implicitly at the expense of firms in the industry though that has not been a part of any studies to-date.
We perform two major empirical analyses: a base model which regresses firm financial, risk, and governance factors on Tobin's q and our primary model which includes institutional investor ownership variables. We note that four major institutional investors consistently appear in our sample as major holders of banks and insurers: Blackrock Capital, Fidelity, State Street Bank, and Vanguard. To determine if any of these holders may influence firm performance, we correlate their ownership stake in each firm with the estimated residuals from our base model. The primary model includes institutional ownership information added to the base model.
The results of our two models are consistent across our control variables. Size, leverage, and line of business focus are positively related to Tobin's q, although the effects for size and focus are lessened or negated for banks. Both total and future compensation are positively related to performance (again, future compensation's effect is negated for banks). Related to ownership and control, insurers with a dual CEO/Board Chair have higher associated Tobin's q. A greater ownership stake by non-family directors and officers is associated with a lower q for all firms. Our measure of operational risk is negatively associated with Tobin's q. However, the investor's risk measure is positively associated with q for insurers.
Our institutional holder results show that larger holdings by Blackrock and Fidelity, respectively, are positively associated with Tobin's q. Also positively and significantly related to a firm's performance is the combined holding of the firm by all four institutions examined.
Our findings indicate that large institutional investors are not necessarily invested in higher Tobin's q firms. However, a higher Tobin's q is associated with the coincidence of greater risk and a stake by the institutional investor. Perhaps these large investors use their influence with management or through proxy votes to support riskier firm initiatives. This would support the classical notion of the diversified investor holding a balanced portfolio of risk-neutral firms seeking to increase risk and returns.
We believe that this paper contributes to a large and growing body of research examining the effects of common ownership. While much of the existing literature focuses on antitrust and anticompetitive behaviors, we also see a need to examine the performance outcome of these large investors. We realize that the findings are limited to two regulated industries only while large institutions invest in all industries. A study of more industries will likely reveal more about the relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance.
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Detail on each firm in the sample and on the variables assembled for each firm 
